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ORIGINALISM AND THE MONTANA CONSTITUTION
Tyler M. Stockton*
I. INTRODUCTION
We the people of Montana grateful to God for the quiet beauty of our state,
the grandeur of our mountains, the vastness of our rolling plains, and desiring
to improve the quality of life, quality of opportunity and to secure the bless-
ings of liberty for this and future generations do ordain and establish this
constitution.1
The Montana Constitution begins with a declaration that it was enacted by
the People of Montana.2 However, since Montana’s Constitution was en-
acted in 1972, the Montana Supreme Court has relied heavily not on the
broad meaning held by the voters, but on the drafter’s intent or meaning
when interpretive questions arise. In fact, the Court has referred to the tran-
scripts of the 1972 Constitutional Convention at least 164 times between
1972 and 2015.3 Constitutional Convention delegates have even brought
lawsuits claiming their intent should inform the Court’s ruling on the mean-
ing of the text.4 This almost exclusive reliance on delegate intent, however,
is not appropriate. Though the delegates wrote the document, they did not
enact the document. Instead, as the Preamble notes, it was “we the People
of Montana” who ratified the new Montana Constitution.5 As such, when
the plain text is unclear, the original public meaning—as it was understood
by the voters at the time of ratification—ought to control over delegate
intent. Montana is blessed with a ratification-era history replete with docu-
ments that shed light on the understanding the people of Montana had when
they enacted the 1972 Constitution. Depending on the distribution, author-
ity, public use, and credibility of those documents, they should inform the
meaning the 1972 Constitution’s language held at the time of ratification.
This framework places the delegate’s intent in its proper interpretive order
* Tyler M. Stockton, 2016 J.D. Candidate at the University of Montana School of Law. I wish to
thank my dear wife, Tia Stockton, for her support in my pursuit of a legal career and my parents,
Thomas and Rebecca Stockton, for their lifelong encouragement. I would also like to thank Professor
Anthony Johnstone for his comments and suggestions as I drafted this article, Fritz Snyder for the
original spark regarding this topic—Fritz Snyder, The Right to Participate and Right to Know in Mon-
tana, 66 MONT. L. REV. 297, 299–301 (2005)—and the staff and editors of the Montana Law Review for
their invaluable time and effort.
1. MONT. CONST. pmbl.
2. Id. (emphasis added).
3. Westlaw Search: “‘constitutional convention’ & date (after 1972 & before 2015).”
4. See e.g., Cross v. VanDyke, 332 P.3d 215, 216 (Mont. 2014); Reichert v. State, 278 P.3d 455,
460 n.2 (Mont. 2012).
5. MONT. CONST. pmbl.
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behind the clear text and the intent of the actual lawmakers of Montana: the
People of Montana.
Part II of this article outlines the history of the 1972 Constitution
through the documents generated and the surrounding events that shaped
those documents and publications. Part III examines modern constitutional
interpretation and, more particularly, focuses on the interpretive theories in
state constitutional law. Part IV examines Montana’s constitutional inter-
pretive framework and offers commentary on the process used by the Mon-
tana Supreme Court. Part V outlines a proposed series of factors for con-
ducting originalist jurisprudence and applies those factors to the documents
available in Montana. Finally, Part VI concludes with an argument that the
Montana Supreme Court should apply and use both the suggested frame-
work and the wealth of ratification documents available when examining
ambiguous language in the Montana Constitution.
II. MONTANA’S CONSTITUTION: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY
The Montana Constitution has had two distinct periods of develop-
ment: the late 1800s and the 1970s.6 In 1866, Acting Governor Thomas F.
Meagher presided over a Constitutional Convention in Helena that drafted a
constitution with hopes of gaining statehood.7 The document was never
presented for ratification and no copy was preserved; only newspapers ref-
erence its existence.8 In 1884, a second proposed constitution fell victim to
Congressional politics, which prevented Montana from receiving the ap-
proval necessary from Congress and the document was never presented to
the voters.9 Unlike the 1866 document, both the text of the 1884 draft and
the 1884 Constitutional Convention records were preserved.10
By 1889, Congress reached a compromise over which states could
enter the union, prompting Montana to hold another Constitutional Conven-
tion.11 The 1884 draft constitution served as the baseline for the 1889 Con-
stitutional Convention and much of the 1884 document was retained.12 In
6. LARRY M. ELISON & FRITZ SNYDER, THE MONTANA STATE CONSTITUTION 3 (G. Alan Tarr ed.,
The Oxford Cmts. on the State Constitutions of the U.S., 2011).
7. Id. at 4.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 4–6 (Republicans and Democrats in Congress blocked new states from entering the union
to keep from altering the balance of power.).
10. See MONTANA CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION, CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF MONTANA, AS
ADOPTED BY THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF THE TERRITORY OF MONTANA, AT THE SESSION
THEREOF BEGUN, JANUARY 14 AND CONCLUDED SATURDAY, FEBRUARY 9, 1884, TO WHICH IS APPENDED
AN ADDRESS TO THE ELECTORS OF THE TERRITORY OF MONTANA (1884); MONTANA CONSTITUTIONAL
CONVENTION, RECORDS OF THE MONTANA CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION (1884).
11. ELISON & SNYDER, supra note 6, at 6. R
12. Id.
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keeping with Montana’s primary concern at the time, “[t]he 1889 Constitu-
tion was enacted more as a tool to achieve statehood than to provide a well-
thought-out structure of governance for the new state.”13 The final docu-
ment was filled with “minutiae and statutory detail.”14 Like the 1884 docu-
ments, the transcripts of the 1889 Constitutional Convention were pre-
served.15 Montanans enacted the document by an overwhelming 91.6%, and
Montana became a part of the Union on November 8, 1889.16
The 1889 Constitution, however, had numerous problems. In response
to popular demands for increased government services and programs, the
executive branch grew from twenty departments, commissions, and boards
to over a hundred, and the limited executive branch designed in 1889 Con-
stitution became large and uncontrollable.17 Over the next sixty years, the
Legislature proposed over 500 amendments to fix the problems in the 1889
Constitution, but most were never enacted.18
The 1960s brought dramatic changes to Montana. Legislative reappor-
tionment and other national issues reshaped the Montana political landscape
from rural to urban.19 “A new interest in reforming and improving society
and government” was also present and “[n]ever, at least not since the Pro-
gressive Era, had Montana seen such widespread popular participation in
politics.”20 This popular participation—known as “new activism”—was
prominent in the Montana Legislature and the statewide effort for constitu-
tional revision.21
In 1967, the Montana Legislature ordered the Legislative Council to
evaluate the Montana Constitution.22 The Legislative Council’s report rec-
ommended substantial changes to the constitution with a focus on creating
an “active, dynamic government.”23 In response, the Montana Legislature
created a Constitutional Revision Commission in 1969 to study the Mon-
tana Constitution and provide recommendations for improvement. The
Commission determined a constitutional convention was necessary, a deci-
13. Id.
14. Richard Roeder, The 1972 Montana Constitution in Historical Context, 51 MONT. L. REV. 260,
263 (1990).
15. See MONTANA CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION, PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE CONSTITU-
TIONAL CONVENTION (1921).
16. ELISON & SNYDER, supra note 6, at 7. R
17. Roeder, supra note 14, at 264; ELISON & SNYDER, supra note 6, at 9. R
18. ELISON & SNYDER, supra note 6, at 8; Roeder, supra note 14, at 265–266. R
19. ELISON & SNYDER, supra note 6, at 10. R
20. MICHAEL P. MALONE & RICHARD B. ROEDER, MONTANA: A HISTORY OF TWO CENTURIES 301
(1976).
21. Id.
22. ELISON & SNYDER, supra note 6, at 10. R
23. Id.
3
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sion that was supported by numerous other groups.24 A referendum for a
new constitutional convention passed 133,482–71,643 in November of
1970.25
During the period between the referendum and the convention, the
Montana Legislature tasked a team of researchers to compile notes and
compare other state constitutions to aid the upcoming convention in draft-
ing the proposed constitution.26 Chaired by Alexander Blewett, this team of
researchers was known as the Montana Constitutional Convention Commis-
sion. The Commission produced a series of research papers organized into
two groups: Constitutional Convention Studies and Research Memoran-
dums.27 The studies covered various topics, providing background informa-
tion for modern constitution drafting and the provisions found in other new
constitutions across the United States.28 The memorandums covered topics
not worthy of an official report, such as the rules for operating a conven-
tion.29 The researchers compiled over 2,300 pages of materials evaluating
constitutions across the United States, the principles of constitutional law,
and other various topics.30
On January 17, 1972, a hundred delegates elected from across the state
met in Helena to begin drafting the proposed constitution.31 The convention
lasted for over two months and the delegates extensively debated each pro-
vision in the document. Each delegate’s own knowledge and experience—
including individual delegate proposals for provisions32— the reports pre-
pared by the Montana Constitutional Convention Commission, and the ear-
lier reports by the Constitutional Revision Commission and the Legislative
Council Convention informed the Convention debates.33 The constitution’s
emphasis on direct participation in governmental decisions was a reflection
24. Id. at 11–12. (Elison and Snyder note this list included the Montana League of Cities and
Towns, the Montana Association of County Commissioners, the Montana Citizens Committee, the Mon-
tana Citizens for Court Improvement, the Judicial Reform Committee of the Montana Bar, the Montana
League of Women Voters, and most newspapers.).
25. Id. at 12.
26. MONTANA CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION COMMISSION, 1971–1972 MEMORANDUM ON CONSTI-
TUTIONAL CONVENTION RULES: MONTANA (1889), HAWAII (1968), MARYLAND (1967), NEW MEXICO
(1969), ARKANSAS (1969), ILLINOIS (1970), NEW JERSEY (1947), NEW YORK (1967), PENNSYLVANIA
(1967), Memo 1, iii (1971) [hereinafter CONVENTION MEMORANDUMS].
27. Id.
28. See e.g. MONTANA CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION COMMISSION, MONTANA CONSTITUTIONAL
CONVENTION STUDIES (1971–1972) (hereinafter CONVENTION STUDIES) (In total, there were numerous
reports extensively covering issues across the legal spectrum.).
29. CONVENTION MEMORANDUMS, supra note 26, Memo 1, at iii. R
30. ELISON & SNYDER, supra note 6, at 13. R
31. Id. at 12.
32. 1 MONTANA CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION VERBATIM TRANSCRIPT, 333–vol. II, 837 (1979)
[hereinafter CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION TRANSCRIPT I].
33. ELISON & SNYDER, supra note 6, at 13; CONVENTION MEMORANDUMS, supra note 26, at Memo. R
1, iii.
4
Montana Law Review, Vol. 77 [2016], Iss. 1, Art. 6
https://scholarship.law.umt.edu/mlr/vol77/iss1/6
\\jciprod01\productn\M\MON\77-1\MON104.txt unknown Seq: 5  9-FEB-16 12:52
2016 ORIGINALISM AND THE MONTANA CONSTITUTION 121
of the delegates’ populist worldview.34 As Constitutional Convention Presi-
dent Leo Graybill noted, the Constitutional Convention “overlooked no op-
portunity to publicize its activities and to encourage public participation.”35
Every vote and meeting (including all committees) “were open to the public
and the press.”36 This openness created an extensive amount of news cover-
age and public notice regarding the Convention and the decisions made
therein.37 The delegates signed the proposed constitution on March 24,
1972.38
After the Convention approved the proposed constitution, the delegates
created a voter education committee to use the remaining funds provided by
the Montana Legislature for educational efforts regarding the new constitu-
tion.39 To fund the voter education, the committee planned to spend a re-
maining $15,000 from the Legislature’s grant to the Constitutional Conven-
tion and another $30,000 from a HUD grant.40 However, Oscar S. Kvaalen
brought a class action suit to bar the committee’s educational efforts, argu-
ing the Constitutional Convention’s power ended upon its conclusion and
therefore it could not conduct the educational initiative.41 The Montana Su-
preme Court granted Kvaalen’s request:
[W]e hold that the Constitutional Convention itself possesses no power or
authority to receive or expend public funds for voter education beyond the
specific requirements and authority found in the Enabling Act; that these re-
quirements in the Enabling Act have already been satisfied; and that the Con-
vention lacks power or authority to receive or expend further public funds for
voter education in the manner proposed by the committee.42
The enabling act for the Constitutional Convention had only authorized the
Secretary of State to send out a Voter Information Pamphlet—also called
the “explanatory notes” to the proposed constitution43—and that was the
extent of the power granted by the Montana Legislature.44 The Court, how-
34. ELISON & SNYDER, supra note 6, at 13. R
35. CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION TRANSCRIPT I, supra note 32, at ii (preface remarks from Consti- R
tutional Convention President Leo Graybill in 1979).
36. Id.
37. Donald E. Larson, Press Coverage of the Montana Constitutional Convention, 16 MONT. JOUR-
NALISM REV. 46, 46 (1973); Charles S. Johnson, The Press and the Constitutional Convention, 17
MONT. JOURNALISM REV. 53, 56–57 (1974).
38. 7 MONTANA CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION VERBATIM TRANSCRIPT, 3041–3946 (1981) [herein-
after CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION TRANSCRIPT VII].
39. State ex rel. Kvaalen v. Graybill, 496 P.2d 1127, 1129 (Mont. 1972).
40. Id.
41. Id. at 1130.
42. Id. at 1135.
43. Keller v. Smith, 553 P.2d 1002, 1007 (Mont. 1976).
44. Kvaalen, 496 P.2d at 1130.
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ever, made it clear that the ruling did not prohibit delegates from pursuing
education efforts on their own.45
The Voter Information Pamphlet was 24 pages long and provided ex-
planations for each provision in the proposed constitution.46 The first page
of the pamphlet prominently noted it was the “Official Publication of the
1972 Constitution Proposed by the 1971–1972 Montana Constitutional
Convention,” its publication was expressly required by “Chapter 206, 1971
Laws of Montana,” and it was financed by an appropriation of the Montana
Legislature.47 The Secretary of State distributed the Voter Information
Pamphlet to all registered voters.48 Due to the Court’s ruling in Kvaalen,
the Voter Information Pamphlet was the only official explanation of the
proposed constitution.49
Following Kvaalen, the delegates, along with other advocacy groups
both for and against the proposed constitution, immediately began funding
their own educational efforts across Montana.50 A group of delegates
formed the Concerned Citizens for Constitutional Improvement and funded
a pamphlet titled The Proposed 1972 Constitution for the State of Montana,
which was commonly known as the Roeder Pamphlet because it was
drafted by Dr. Richard B. Roeder and Dr. Pierce C. Mullen.51 The pamphlet
was  distributed across all of Montana as a newspaper insert.52 The Roeder
Pamphlet contained detailed descriptions of the provisions and explanations
of what they meant. It also contained a note at the end that it had been
reviewed for “accuracy, style, and objectivity” by Mrs. Margaret S. War-
den, Mrs. Thomas Payne, and Mr. Fred Martin.53
On the other side of the state, Gerald J. Neely, a Billings lawyer, pub-
lished a pamphlet titled A Critical Look: Montana’s New Constitution and
sent it to a distribution list developed during the Constitutional Conven-
45. Id. at 1135–1136.
46. Id. at 1130; PROPOSED 1972 CONSTITUTION FOR THE STATE OF MONTANA: OFFICIAL TEXT WITH
EXPLANATION (1972) [hereinafter VOTER INFORMATION PAMPHLET].
47. VOTER INFORMATION PAMPHLET, supra note 46, at 1.
48. Kvaalen, 496 P.2d at 1129.
49. Id. at 1135.
50. ELISON & SNYDER, supra note 6, at 16–18; Rob Natelson, Documentary History of the Ratifica- R
tion of the Montana Constitution, WILLIAM J. JAMESON LAW LIBRARY, http://perma.cc/H6GD-A8J8 (last
visited Sept. 12, 2015) [hereinafter DOCUMENTARY HISTORY].
51. CONCERNED CITIZENS FOR CONSTITUTIONAL IMPROVEMENT, PROPOSED CONSTITUTION FOR THE
STATE OF MONTANA 11 (1972), available at http://perma.cc/P5UG-ZPEC (last visited Sept. 12, 2015)
[hereinafter ROEDER PAMPHLET].
52. Id. at 1. (It was an insert in the Billings Gazette, Bozeman Daily Chronicle, Montana Standard,
Dillon Daily Tribune-Examiner, Great Falls Tribune, Daily Ravalli Republican, Havre Daily News,
Helena Independent Record, Kalispell Inter Lake, Lewistown Daily News, Livingston Enterprise, Miles
City Star, and the Missoula Missoulian.).
53. Id. at 11 (Mrs. Margaret Warden was a renowned librarian in Helena and a delegate, Mrs.
Thomas Payne was a delegate, and Mr. Fred Martin was a delegate.).
6
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tion.54 Mr. Neely had been a United Press International string reporter
throughout the Constitutional Convention and had published a newsletter
during the Constitutional Convention known as the Con Con Newsletter.55
The pamphlet contained commentary on what the proposed constitution
meant.56 Neely’s commentary has been referred to as a fairly neutral docu-
ment reflecting on the proposed constitution.57
Throughout the Constitutional Convention and the ratification process,
Montana newspapers published extensive articles on the proposed docu-
ment.58 News coverage came primarily from the Associated Press, the Lee
State Bureau, and the Tribune State Bureau.59 The Tribune printed 430 sto-
ries covering over 5,300 column-inches between January 17, 1972 and
March 24, 1972. The Missoulian ran 347 stories for a total of 4,300 col-
umn-inches. The Gazette ran 271 stories covering 3,200 column inches.
Each of these papers also ran numerous editorials: the Tribune ran 26, the
Missoulian 22, and the Gazette 13.60 Newspapers and news agencies dedi-
cated five full-time reporters to the Constitutional Convention: the Associ-
ated Press had one, the Tribune Capitol Bureau had two, and Lee Newspa-
pers State Bureau (serving the Gazette, the Standard, the Missoulian, and
the Independent Record) had two.61 And, although there was no television
press assigned to the Convention, Cable TV provided 25 hours of cover-
age.62 During the ratification period between the Constitutional Convention
and the June 6, 1972, vote, the Associated Press released a ten-article series
and the Lee State Bureau carried a 21-article series explaining the new con-
stitution.63
Opposition material came primarily from the Farm Bureau Federation,
the Taxpayers Association, and some unions.64 Opponents used newspaper
coverage, radio, and television to air their objections.65 The Associated
Press noted “most of the opposition focused on the taxation article.”66 Sup-
54. GERALD J. NEELY, A CRITICAL LOOK: MONTANA’S NEW CONSTITUTION 1, 3 (1972), available at
http://perma.cc/47VN-JHSW (last visited Sept. 12, 2015) [hereinafter NEELY PAMPHLET].
55. Id.
56. See e.g., id. at 2–3.
57. Rob Natelson, Montana Constitution Project Unveiled at UM, MONT. LAW., May 2008, at 14,
15.
58. Larson, supra note 37, at 46. A collection of the articles published between the end of the R
Constitutional Convention and ratification on June 6, 1972 can be found in the DOCUMENTARY HISTORY,
supra note 50.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Johnson, supra note 37, at 54. R
62. Id.
63. Id. at 57.
64. Id. at 58; ELISON & SNYDER, supra note 6, at 14–15. R
65. Johnson, supra note 37, at 57. R
66. Id. at 58.
7
Stockton: Originalism and the Montana Constitution
Published by The Scholarly Forum @ Montana Law, 2016
\\jciprod01\productn\M\MON\77-1\MON104.txt unknown Seq: 8  9-FEB-16 12:52
124 MONTANA LAW REVIEW Vol. 77
porting the tax opposition was the highway lobby, which included unions,
oil companies, and Montana’s AAA. Particularly, they disagreed with the
proposal to allow the diversion of earmarked highway funds by a three-
fifths vote of the Montana Legislature.67
Finally, proponents and opponents engaged in a varying array of pri-
vate correspondence and local advocacy.68 The AFL-CIO, one of the unions
supporting the constitution, produced a flyer debunking rumors about the
proposed constitution.69 The Montana Common Cause endorsed the propo-
sal with a letter hoping for a unicameral legislature, annual legislative ses-
sions, and a strong right to know provision.70 The Montana League of Cit-
ies and Towns penned a letter to one of the delegates noting the proposed
constitution was an “excellent document” that would be a “foundation on
which Montana can progress in the future.”71 The Montana Farm Bureau
opposed the taxing provisions, noting the proposed document would “elimi-
nate the requirement that taxes be collected uniformly.”72 The Associated
General Contractors of America published a letter to their members in Mon-
tana noting the proposed document had a “watered-down proposal” for the
anti-diversion amendment.73
Following a brief and intense period after the Constitutional Conven-
tion’s proposal on March 24, 1972, the voters ratified the new constitution
on June 6, 1972, by a thin margin: 116,415–113,883.74 In 1979, the Mon-
tana Legislature, the Montana Legislative Council, and the Constitutional
Convention’s Editing and Publishing Committee published the entirety of
the Constitutional Convention in a series of eight volumes.75 The series,
titled 1971–1972 Montana Constitutional Convention, contained a brief his-
tory of the Convention, the proposals made by individual delegates, the
67. Id.
68. As a note, the documents referenced here are merely a representative sample of the incredibly
large collection of materials from that period. Most of these materials were somewhat private in nature
and were confined to either the members of an association or private correspondence. See DOCUMEN-
TARY HISTORY, supra note 50.
69. AFL-CIO, SOS DIDN’T FOOL YOU LAST FALL! DON’T LET MATE FOOL YOU JUNE 6! (1972),
available at http://perma.cc/M3J7-8HV7 (last visited Sept. 13, 2015).
70. Letter from Bryant Hatch & Robin Hatch, Co-Chairmen, Montana Common Cause to Dorothy
Eck, Delegate, Mont. Const. Convention (Apr. 14, 1972), available at http://perma.cc/2KGG-6HNE (last
visited Sept. 12, 2015).
71. Letter from Dan K. Mizner, Executive Director, Montana League of Cities and Towns to Fred
Martin, Delegate, Mont. Const. Convention (Mar. 23, 1972), available at http://perma.cc/N4HH-
TB6L (last visited Sept. 12, 2015).
72. MONTANA FARM BUREAU, THE BIG DECISION “ON OUR CONSTITUTION” 3 (1972), available at
http://perma.cc/2PU8-DZ2D (last visited Sept. 13, 2015).
73. Letter from Montana Contractors Ass’n to Members and Associate Members of Montana Con-
tractors Ass’n 1 (May 24, 1972), available at http://perma.cc/ 2DQR-EYBM (last visited Sept. 13,
2015).
74. ELISON & SNYDER, supra note 6, at 16–18. R
75. MONTANA CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION VERBATIM TRANSCRIPT (1979–1981).
8
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Committee Proposals for each section of the proposed constitution, and a
verbatim transcript of the entire Constitutional Convention.
In 2008, Professor Robert Natelson, with the aid of the libraries at
Montana State University and the University of Montana, the Montana His-
torical Society, and various delegates, pulled many of the above noted rati-
fication materials together and digitized the collection. The materials are
now available online at the William J. Jameson Law Library at the Univer-
sity of Montana School of Law.76
III. ORIGINAL MEANING & STATE CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION
The originalist interpretive theory has grown in prominence and sup-
port across the ideological spectrum. Although it is sometimes implemented
in different ways, originalism is broadly accepted as a basis of constitu-
tional interpretation.77 As U.S. Supreme Court Justice Elena Kagan noted
during her confirmation hearings, today “we are all originalists.”78
A. Original Public Meaning
When the text of a document is not clear, how does one determine
what it means? Originalism proposes a solution. Originalism holds that the
original public meaning (not the drafter’s subjective intent)79 of the text is
76. DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 50; Natelson, supra note 57.
77. Jack M. Balkin notes “[t]here is by now a large literature on the proper use of history in consti-
tutional argument” and lists extensive scholarship on originalism and its use and implementation. Jack
M. Balkin, The New Originalism and the Uses of History, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 641, 644 (2013); see
also Jack N. Rakove, Fidelity Through History (Or to It), 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1587, 1592 n.14 (1997)
(“‘[A]vowedly originalist’ can be read in two ways: either narrowly, as propounding a commitment to
originalism as the one best mode of interpretation, or more broadly, as recognizing that some serious and
responsible attempt to recover the original meanings of contested provisions is a necessary and proper
element of the interpretive endeavor. A list of those who could be called originalists in one or both of
these senses (especially the latter, latitudinal one) would include Bruce Ackerman, Akhil Amar, Chris
Eisgruber, Daniel Farber, Martin Flaherty, Michael Klarman, Michael McConnell, Mark Killenbeck,
Larry Kramer, Henry Monaghan, and William Treanor. But in truth, the turn to originalism seems so
general that citation is almost beside the point.”).
78. Kagan Originalism, Clip: Kagan Confirmation Hearing, Day 2, Part 1 (C-Span television
broadcast June 29, 2010), available at http://perma.cc/AC88-VTXY.
79. Originalism, as an interpretive theory, resurfaced in response to, in essence, the application of
common law jurisprudence to constitutional interpretive questions and the rise of the “living constitu-
tion.” ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 41 (1997). In
the latter 20th Century, legal jurists, perhaps most prominently Edward Meese and Ronald Bork, began
arguing that the original intent of the framers of the constitution ought to control. This view was widely
attacked and many declared originalism “dead.” (This conclusion comes from four widely argued criti-
cisms of originalism: (1) it’s impossible to know the aggregate “intent” of the ratifiers and therefore
impossible to know the intent at all; (2) the framers themselves didn’t believe in original intent; (3) the
original constitution was enacted by white males, not the people as a whole; and (4) the original ratifiers
were racist and sexist. RANDY BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMPTION OF
LIBERTY 89–91 (2004).The originalism espoused by Meese and Bork was one of intent. E.g. Edwin
9
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the controlling guide when the text itself is unclear.80 Constitutions are not
detailed documents. Rather than providing mind-numbing detail, they
sketch the outline and the framework for the law.81 Therefore, the context
of the document is important. As Justice Antonin Scalia noted: “[I]n textual
interpretation, context is everything, and the context of the Constitution
tells us not to expect nit-picking detail, and to give words and phrases an
expansive rather than narrow interpretation—though not an interpretation
that the language will not bear.”82 Preeminent constitutional scholar Akhil
Amar83 echoes Justices Scalia and Kagan.84 Originalists begin with the doc-
ument, but often times, the document presents a “wide range of possible
applications.”85 Therefore, Amar concludes, one must study the textual
analysis and the enactment history with the goal to “understand what the
American People meant and did when We ratified and amended the docu-
ment.”86 This inquiry seeks “to braid arguments from text, history, and
structure into an interpretive rope whose strands mutually reinforce.”87
Meese III, A Return to Constitutional Interpretation from Judicial Law-Making, 40 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV.
925, 926 (1996) (“The active role in determining public policy should be with Congress and with the
Executive, as the elected branches of government. By contrast, an activist federal judiciary is inconsis-
tent with the intent of the Constitution and is inherently undemocratic. When the federal judiciary hon-
ors the intent of the Framers and maintains its proper Constitutional role, the Legislative and Executive
branches are free to promote civil rights or any other issue as they see fit.”); Robert H. Bork, The
Constitution, Original Intent, and Economic Rights, 23 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 823 (1986). However, theo-
rists have largely abandoned “intent” and refined originalism into “original meaning” or “original public
meaning.” Original public meaning is not original intent. BARNETT, supra, at 79. (“Perhaps most impor-
tant of all, however, is that originalism has itself changed—from original intention to original meaning.
No longer do originalists claim to be seeking the subjective intentions of the framers. Now both Robert
Bork and Antonin Scalia, no less than Ronald Dworkin and Bruce Ackerman, seek the original meaning
of the text.”). “Whereas ‘original intent’ originalism seeks the intentions or will of the lawmakers or
ratifiers, ‘original meaning’ originalism seeks the public or objective meaning that a reasonable listener
would place on the words used in the constitutional provision at the time of its enactment.” BARNETT,
supra, at 79. Originalism examines the text, the surrounding circumstances, and the meaning ascribed to
it by those ratifying and voting on the language to interpret the meaning of the text if it is unclear.
80. E.g. SCALIA, supra note 79, at 38; KEITH WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 35
(1999); Balkin, supra note 77, at 645; Akhil Reed Amar, Foreward: The Document and the Doctrine, R
114 HARV. L. REV. 26, 26 (2000).
81. SCALIA, supra note 79, at 37 (citing Chief Justice Marshall in McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S.
316, 407 (1819)).
82. Id.
83. Akhil Reed Amar is the Sterling Professor of Law and Political Science at Yale University. He
teaches constitutional law at Yale Law School, holds awards from the American Bar Association and the
Federalist Society for his work on the United States Constitution, and has been favorably cited over 30
times by the United States Supreme Court. Yale Law School, Akhil Reed Amar, https://perma.cc/PN6G-
6BJE (last visited Nov. 14, 2015).
84. Amar, supra note 80, at 26.
85. Id. at 28.
86. Id. at 28–29.
87. Id. at 31.
10
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This interpretive theory is not new. As John O. McGinnis88 and
Michael Rappaport,89 the authors of Originalism and the Good Constitu-
tion, note: “[o]riginalism—the view that the constitution should be inter-
preted according to its original meaning—has been an important principle
of constitutional interpretation since the early republic.”90 Further, James
Madison noted in 1824:
I entirely concur in the propriety of resorting to the sense in which the Consti-
tution was accepted and ratified by the nation. In that sense alone it is the
legitimate Constitution. And if that be not the guide in expounding it, there
can be no security for a consistent and stable . . . exercise of its powers.91
In sum, originalism simply looks to the original meaning of a document
when resolving textual ambiguities.92
Since the theory of originalism was introduced, its use has been de-
fended on various grounds, including: (1) originalism is the most demo-
cratic interpretive theory; (2) written text naturally leads to originalism; and
(3) originalism supports the supermajoritarian nature of constitutions.
1. Democracy & Originalism
The democratic defense of originalism argues that originalism trusts
and defends the ideals of the democratic process. According to Justice
Scalia and Bryan Garner, the current editor of Black’s Law Dictionary, ar-
gue in their work Reading Law, “[o]riginalism is the only approach to text
that is compatible with democracy.”93 America’s political structure—both
state and federal—is set up so statutes and constitutions are enacted and
amended in a structured democratic process. Through this process, the laws
and constitutions were supported or opposed based on an understanding re-
garding their meaning. However, “[w]hen applied to the Constitution, no-
noriginalism limits the democratic process itself, prohibiting (through imag-
inative interpretation of the Bill of Rights) acts of self-governance that ‘We
the people’ never, ever, voted to outlaw.”94 Any change or interpretation of
88. John O. McGinnis is the George C. Dix Professor of Constitutional Law at the University of
Northwestern School of Law. Northwestern School of Law, John O. McGinnis, http://perma.cc/SZT4-
SEJ6 (last visited Nov. 14, 2015).
89. Michael Rappaport is the Hugh and Hazel Darling Foundation Professor of Law and Director,
Center for the Study of Constitutional Originalism at the University of San Diego School of Law. Uni-
versity of San Diego School of Law, Michael B. Rappaport, https://perma.cc/HB6F-VD66 (last visited
Nov. 14, 2015).
90. JOHN O. MCGINNIS & MICHAEL B. RAPPAPORT, ORIGINALISM AND THE GOOD CONSTITUTION 1
(2013).
91. JOHN MADISON, Letter from James Madison to Henry Lee (June 25, 1824), in IX JAMES
MADISON, THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 191 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1910) (emphasis added).
92. MCGINNIS & RAPPAPORT, supra note 90, at 1.
93. ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW 82 (2012) (emphasis original).
94. Id. at 88.
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a document that is inconsistent with the original public meaning changes
the law as democratically enacted or ratified. As such, any interpretive the-
ory that is not originalist is essentially anti-democratic.
2. Written Text & Originalism
Some, notably the constitutional scholar Randy Barnett,95 defend
originalism under the theory that, like contracts, “[o]riginal meaning fol-
lows naturally . . . from the commitment to a written text.”96 “[F]rom the
Magna Carta onward, there has always been an interest in getting political
commitments in writing.”97 The idea of the constitution as a contract is not
new; Social Contract Theory was quite prevalent during the Founding
Era.98 A constitution serves as a “written contract.”99
Written contracts are evidence of the agreed-to bargain.100 “Like a
written contract, a written constitution provides good evidence of what
terms were actually enacted when later they might be disputed.”101 As such,
they are subject to the amendment provisions in the actual document, the
parol evidence rule, and the rules of construction. Like amendment provi-
sions in contracts, the amendment process for constitutions functions to
clarify the document’s purpose and to do so in a legally binding manner.102
The parol evidence rule is also applicable. “Contradicting the explicit provi-
sions of a writing undermines its ability to satisfy the functions of formality
in a way that supplementing it when it is incomplete or when it explicitly
authorizes supplementation does not.”103 The objective approach to inter-
preting a contract “looks to the publicly accessible meaning that a reasona-
ble person would attach to the words in context.”104 In this way, the ex-
pressed meaning is “locked in” and preserved for future generations until
the document is amended.105
In sum, originalism is contract theory applied to constitutions. Consti-
tutions are the governing law of a land. They are enacted pursuant to vari-
ous democratic means, and, without fail, have amendment provisions in
95. Randy Barnett is the Carmack Waterhouse Professor of Legal Theory at the Georgetown Uni-
versity School of Law. He teaches constitutional law and directs the Georgetown Center for the Consti-
tution. Georgetown Law, Randy E. Barnett, https://perma.cc/7R8B-FC6X (last visited Nov. 14, 2015).
96. BARNETT, supra note 79, at 100.
97. Id. at 101.
98. See  THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN, Pt. 1, Ch. 13 (1651); JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF
GOVERNMENT Ch. 8 (1689); JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, ON THE SOCIAL CONTRACT Bk II, Ch. 4 (1762).
99. BARNETT, supra note 79, at 101.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 102.
103. Id. at 102–103.
104. Id. at 103.
105. BARNETT, supra note 79, at 101.
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them. Since a contract “locks in” the meaning the parties intended at the
time they agreed, a constitution should receive similar treatment: the origi-
nal meaning of those enacting the agreement should control when the text is
unclear.
3. Supermajoritarianism & Originalism
The supermajoritarian defense of originalism argues that when a docu-
ment is enacted pursuant to supermajoritarian principles, those principles
tend to produce desirable constitutions and, as such, the meaning of the
document when it was enacted must control.106 As John O. McGinnis and
Michael B. Rappaport, the authors of Originalism and the Good Constitu-
tion, note: “[i]n short, it is the supermajoritarian genesis of the Constitution
that explains both why the document is desirable and why the desirability
requires that it be given its original meaning.”107 As a broad principle, the
supermajoritarian process has a greater chance of producing a good consti-
tution.108 The supermajoritarian process “create[s] the consensus and non-
partisanship necessary for fostering allegiance to a constitution that desira-
bly regulates politics and society.”109 Supermajorities better (1) aggregate
citizen preferences;110 and (2) aggregate judgments to determine what best
promotes public interest.111 First, supermajoritarian entrenchments (enact-
ments that require supermajorities to remove) best aggregate citizen prefer-
ences because they create consensus,112 inhibit partisanship,113 and protect
minorities.114 Second, in general, the majority consensus is usually the best
decision-making method.115 A supermajority consensus produces even
more accurate decisions than simple majorities because supermajorities re-
quire more debate and process to enact.116 Therefore, decisions made under
106. MCGINNIS & RAPPAPORT, supra note 90, at 11 (The supermajoritarian justification of original-
ism is a relatively a new defense of originalism.).
107. Id.
108. Id. at 21.
109. Id. at 33.
110. Id. at 33, 35.
111. Id. at 33, 47.
112. MCGINNIS & RAPPAPORT, supra note 90, at 38 (Supermajorities require more than the simple
majority, and therefore, end up requiring more individuals to support the provision. As such, there is
greater consensus and buy-in, which strengthens the constitution.).
113. Id. at 39 (Partisan provisions usually only have a majority support, however provisions sup-
ported by a supermajority must draw consent from both (or more) political parties.).
114. Id. at 42 (One never knows when they will be in the minority and since entrenched provisions
can only be removed by a supermajority, supermajority enactments generally protect minorities due to
this “veil of ignorance” about future conditions.).
115. Id. at 48.
116. Id. at 53–55.
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supermajorities generally promote the public interest in the best possible
manner.117
Documents rooted in proper supermajoritarian principles,118 like con-
stitutions, ought to be interpreted by the original meaning because that
meaning is the only meaning reached through the supermajoritarian pro-
cess. As McGinnis and Rappaport conclude:
A good constitution enacted under supermajority rules should be interpreted
according to its original meaning. The beneficence of the good constitution
derives from the consensus support it gained among the enactors. In consider-
ing whether to support the constitution, the enactors would have voted for or
against the constitution based on the meaning they attributed to it. Thus, it is
the original meaning, not some other meaning, that has the beneficence con-
veyed by the supermajoritarian process. The constitution-making process
catches that consensus and crystallizes it in a text, like the capture of lightning
in a bottle. Originalism then preserves that light for future generations.119
B. State Constitutional Originalism
State constitutional interpretation, in the words of Justice Russell
Nigro, is an important, but “often-overlooked aspect of state law.”120 The
United States’ federal structure is unique and poses a unique problem: with
dual sovereigns, there must be some departure when the text and history of
the two constitutions differ, otherwise there is no reason for the second
sovereign. However, how much and in what way is often difficult to deter-
mine.
1. State Constitutions are Different
State constitutions are quite different from the federal constitution.
State constitutions  have different origins; contain different legal premises;
and are quite changeable compared to the federal constitution.121 First, ori-
gins of state constitutions vary greatly both from each other and the U.S.
Constitution. There are different sets of founders for each state.122 The
117. Id. at 57–58.
118. There can be too strict or too loose supermajority provisions for enacting and amending en-
trenched documents. The U.S. Constitution manages an appropriate balance of these two extremes. State
constitutions are largely enacted with provisions similar to the U.S. Constitution and would, therefore,
have similarly acceptable supermajority provisions. MCGINNIS & RAPPAPORT, supra note 90, at 62–80.
119. MCGINNIS & RAPPAPORT, supra note 90, at 82.
120. Russell M. Nigro, The Importance of Interpretive Theory in State Constitutional Law, 73 TEMP.
L. REV. 905, 906 (2000) (Justice Nigro was a member of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.).
121. G. Alan Tarr, State Constitutional Design and State Constitutional Interpretation, 72 MONT. L.
REV. 7, 9 (2011); see also Robert F. Williams, The Brennan Lecture: Interpreting State Constitutions As
Unique Legal Documents, 27 OKLA. CITY U.L. REV. 189, 191 (2002) (“State constitutions are sui
generis, differing from the Federal Constitution in their origin, function, and form.”).
122. Tarr, supra note 121, at 9.
14
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United States’ founders were individuals representing each state at the Phil-
adelphia Convention. In the States, this can be very different. For example,
in Montana, conventions are held by those elected in their respective ar-
eas.123 Each state has different social concerns as compared to both each
other and the federal level.124 The Founders at the Philadelphia Convention
were not dealing with mining or railroad interests or their later environmen-
tal consequences, yet those interests were at the forefront for both the 1889
and 1972 Montana Conventions.125 Finally, with the passage of time, each
state has enacted their constitutions in different political eras, which neces-
sarily reflect different values, priorities, and concerns.126
Second, legal premises in state constitutions are quite different from
the federal constitution.127 As G. Alan Tarr128 noted, the author of Under-
standing State Constitutions, “when legislative power is divided in a federal
system, one government must receive grants of power and the other retain
residual power.”129 Such is the situation in the United States: the federal
constitution is a grant and the states have retained the remaining rights. In
McCulloch v. Maryland,130 the the Court noted the grant of power to Con-
gress contained implied powers, but recognized the grant had limits: it had
to be within the “scope of the constitution.”131State constitutions, however,
approach the question from an entirely different angle. The question is not
whether it is authorized, but rather whether it is prohibited.132 As Frank
Grad, 133 author of State Constitutions for the Twenty-First Century, re-
marked,
123. MONT. CONST. art. XIV, § 4.
124. Tarr, supra note 121, at 10–12.
125. See e.g., MONT. CONST. of 1889, art. XV, § 13. (“The legislative assembly shall pass no law for
the benefit of a railroad or other corporation, or any individual or association of individuals’ retrospec-
tive in its operation, or which imposes on the people of any county or municipal subdivision of the state,
a, new liability in respect to transactions or considerations already passed.”); MONT. CONST. art. IX,
§ 1(1) (“The state and each person shall maintain and improve a clean and healthful environment in
Montana for present and future generations.”).
126. Tarr, supra note 121, at 11–12.
127. Id. at 12–14; Williams, supra note 121, at 207 (State constitutions are “often referred to as
documents of limitation rather than documents granting powers.”).
128. G. Alan Tarr is the Director of the Center for State Constitutional Studies and Distinguished
Professor of Political Science at Rutgers University-Camden. He is the editor of State Constitutions of
the United States and co-editor of State Constitutions for the Twenty-First Century. Rutgers, The State
University of New Jersey, Camden, Center for State Constitutional Studies, http://perma.cc/38LN-
K6MY (last visited Nov. 15, 2015).
129. G. ALAN. TARR, UNDERSTANDING STATE CONSTITUTIONS 27 (1998).
130. 17 U.S. 316 (1819).
131. TARR, supra note 129, at 7 (quoting Marbury, 17 U.S. at 421).
132. Id. (noting the Kansas Supreme Court’s discussion of the issue: “When the constitutionality of a
statute is involved, the question presented is, therefore, not whether the act is authorized by the constitu-
tion, but whether it is prohibited thereby.” Schneider v. Kennedy, 587 P.2d 844, 850 (Kan. 1978).).
133. Frank Grad was the Joseph P. Chamberlain Professor Emeritus of Legislation at Columbia Law
School. He was the author of numerous works on state constitutional law and participated in drafting the
15
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It must be emphasized that very nearly everything that may be included in a
state constitution operates as a restriction on the legislature, for both com-
mands and prohibitions directed to other branches of the government or even
to the individual citizen will operate to invalidate inconsistent legislation.134
Further, state constitutions often carry mandates, while the federal constitu-
tion largely does not.135 In Montana, for example, the the state and each
person must “maintain and improve” a clean environment.136
Finally, state constitutions are generally much more amendable.137 The
federal constitution was adopted in 1789 and has only been amended 27
times.138 Montana’s current constitution was enacted in 1972 and has been
amended 31 times to date.139 The amendment process for state constitutions
often includes constitutional initiatives, a form of amendment unavailable
in the U.S. Constitution.140
These differences mean that state courts ought to interpret their own
constitutions on their respective merits.141 State constitutions are not merely
“miniature version[s] of the United States Constitution.”142 In a nation of
dual sovereigns, the principles of federalism demand that, even if the mean-
ing ends up identical, the governing documents of both sovereigns must be
interpreted by their own text and their own history. As Tarr remarks, if the
documents are not interpreted on their own merits, it “renders states[’]
rights superfluous, a dubious result given the deliberate adoption of these
guarantees by state constitution-makers.”143 As such, there has been a trend
of judges and scholars who emphasize “principled state constitutional juris-
prudence” over result-oriented interpretation.144
Model State Constitution. Columba Law School, Professor Emeritus Frank Grad ‘49 LL.B., Pioneering
Public and Environmental Law Attorney, Dies, law.columbia.edu, http://perma.cc/Y89S-Z4MX (last ac-
cessed Nov. 15, 2015).
134. Frank P. Grad, The State Constitution: Its Function and Form for Our Time, 54 VA. L. REV.
928, 964–965 (1968).
135. Tarr, supra note 129, at 14; see e.g., OR. CONST. art. XI (The Oregon legislature shall enact
legislation to carry out the State Power Development provisions); HAW. CONST. art. IX, § 1 (“The State
shall provide for the protection and promotion of the public health.”); ARIZ. CONST. art. XI, § 1 (“The
legislature shall enact such laws as shall provide for the establishment and maintenance of a general and
uniform public school system.”).
136. MONT. CONST. art. IX, § 1(1).
137. Tarr, supra note 121, at 14–15.
138. U.S. CONST. amends. I–XXVII.
139. COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, THE BOOK OF STATES 10 (2014).
140. Tarr, supra note 129, at 25–26; see e.g. MONT. CONST. art. XIV, § 2.
141. Tarr, supra note 121, at 8–9.
142. Id. at 8.
143. Tarr, supra note 129, at 182.
144. G. Alan Tarr, Constitutional Theory and State Constitutional Interpretation, 22 RUTGERS L.J.
841, 842 (1991).
16
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2. State Constitutional Originalism
Interpreting state constitutions as separate documents has led many
states to embrace originalism145 Noting the differences between state and
federal constitutions, state jurisprudence has “largely ignored contemporary
constitutional theory and espoused an interpretive approach that emphasizes
the distinctiveness of state provisions and the intent of their framers.”146 To
break from federal interpretation, jurists have often focused on the “intent
of the framers and to the historical circumstances out of which the constitu-
tional provisions arose.”147 This, in essence, has guided state jurists towards
“textualism and original intent.”148
State constitutions owe their enactment and authority to the voters in a
given state, not to ratifying conventions or national framers.149 Therefore,
the originalist inquiry seeks the meaning held by the voters themselves—
not the drafters—since the voters enacted the constitution.150 In fact, as
Frank Grad and Robert Williams note, there are questions regarding
whether constitutional convention materials are even relevant in state con-
stitutional interpretation.151 Instead, the focus falls on the materials pro-
vided to the voters when they ratified the constitution.152
State originalist constitutional interpretation has a wealth of informa-
tion unknown to federal interpretive work. State constitutions have devel-
oped over time and as of today, only two states have a constitution dating
back to the 18th century (Massachusetts and New Hampshire), 26 were en-
acted in the 19th Century, and 22 have constitutions from the 20th Cen-
tury.153 The U.S. Constitution has been amended, but has remained rela-
tively unchanged since its enactment in 1789. Unlike the U.S. Constitution,
the developments in communications, reporting, and technology likely
mean many state constitutions have far more in-depth ratification
records.154
145. Tarr, supra note 121, at 8.
146. Tarr, supra note 144, at 843.
147. Id. at 848.
148. Id. (When state jurists opt to depart from federal interpretation, they are often criticized as
being results oriented and, as such, they often spend a great deal of time defending the legitimacy of
their opinions. Again, this means “an emphasis on differences in text and/or generating history—in a
word (or in fact two), original intent.” Tarr, supra note 144, at 855).
149. Williams, supra note 121, at 194; 2 FRANK P. GRAD & ROBERT F. WILLIAMS, STATE CONSTITU-
TIONS FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 76 (2006).
150. GRAD & WILLIAMS, supra note 149, at 78.
151. Id.
152. Williams, supra note 121, at 196.
153. COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, supra note 139, at 10.
154. Tarr, supra note 144, at 852.
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The modern nature of many state constitutions make originalist inter-
pretation particularly relevant.155 As Tarr notes, “[t]he more recent the con-
stitutional provision, the more likely that there is an extensive documentary
record—pre-convention studies, constitutional convention records, voters’
pamphlets, and the like—bearing on its meaning.”156 The availability of
this information makes the originalist inquiry particularly suited to many
state constitutions.157
IV. MONTANA’S INTERPRETIVE FRAMEWORK
The Montana Supreme Court has adhered to a broad principle of sepa-
rate constitutional interpretation with its regular decisions to not “march
lockstep” with the United States Supreme Court.158 Montana’s interpretive
framework is originalist: the Montana Supreme Court attempts to derive
meaning from secondary sources when the text is unclear. However, the
Court’s approach has two weaknesses. First, the Court sometimes confuses
the terminology used and the methodology implemented. Second, the Court
usually uses only one source to derive meaning.
A. Montana’s Interpretive Framework
For the Montana Supreme Court, Text is the clearest indication of
meaning and, as such, interpretation must always begin with the text. As the
Court has noted extensively: “[t]he intent of the framers of the Constitution
is controlling and that intent must first be determined from the plain lan-
guage of the words used.”159 Textual construction uses the “plain meaning
of the words used and [applies] their usual and ordinary meaning.”160 This
principle is quite old in Montana jurisprudence and predates the current
Constitution.161
155. Id. at 851.
156. Id. at 852.
157. Id. at 851–852.
158. E.g. Jacobsen v. Allstate Ins. Co., 310 P.3d 452, 459 (Mont. 2013) (“Because the Montana
version of Rule 23 is identical to the corresponding federal rule, federal authority is instructive, but
Montana courts are not required to march lockstep with federal interpretations of Fed. R. Civ. P. 23.”);
Brilz v. Metro. Gen. Ins. Co., 285 P.3d 494, 500 (Mont. 2012) (refusing to follow federal pleading
standards in Montana).
159. Cross, 332 P.3d at 217 (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added).
160. Id. (internal citations omitted).
161. Racicot v. Dist. Ct. of First Jud. Dist. In and For County of Lewis and Clark, 794 P.2d 1180,
1183 (Mont. 1990); Butte-Silver Bow Loc. Govt. v. State, 768 P.2d 327, 330 (Mont. 1989) (The intent
of the framers of the provision is controlling.); Keller, 553 P.2d at 1006 (“In determining the meaning of
a given provision, the intent of the framers is controlling. . . . Such intent shall first be determined from
the plain meaning of the words used, if possible, and if the intent can be so determined, the courts may
not go further and apply any other means of interpretation.”); Lloyd v. Silver Bow County, 28 P. 453,
455–456 (Mont. 1891) (“We are of the opinion that the intent of the framers of the constitution is that
18
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For statutory provisions, the Court consistently looks to the Montana
Legislature and the debate surrounding individual bills for guidance on
meaning.162 As the Montana Code notes: “[i]n the construction of a statute,
the intention of the legislature is to be pursued if possible.”163 To do this,
the Court examines the legislative history.164 This makes sense because the
debate and conversation surrounding the adoption of the legislation gives
insight as to the meaning of the legislation.
For constitutional provisions, the Court “applies the same rules in the
construction of the Constitution that it applies in the construction of stat-
utes.”165 First, the intent of the framers is determined from the “plain lan-
guage of the words used.”166 If ambiguity remains, the Court then examines
the legislative history, like they do with statutes, to resolve any doubt.167
For this inquiry, “[t]he rule is well established that, in construction of a
constitution, recourse may be had to proceedings of the constitutional con-
vention.”168
B. Commentary on Montana’s Interpretive Framework
The Montana Supreme Court is thoroughly originalist. However, there
are two weak points in the Court’s analysis: (1) the use of intent as the
interpretive goal while functionally seeking meaning; and (2) the Court’s
almost exclusive use of one originalist source for such meaning.
the salary or emoluments of an officer like that of the sheriff, who was elected in October, 1889, shall be
subject to the control of the legislative assembly, and that the power to “fix” carried with it the implied
right to increase or diminish the same by amending the statutes which may be in force. This construction
gives full life to the proviso.”).
162. Dunphy v. Anaconda Co., 438 P.2d 660, 662 (Mont. 1968) (“In construing a statute, the inten-
tion of the Legislature is controlling.”); State v. Hicks, 296 P.3d 1149, 1152 (Mont. 2013) (“We seek to
implement the legislature’s intent when we interpret a statute. . . . We look first to the plain language of
the statute to determine legislative intent.”).
163. MONT. CODE. ANN. § 1–2–102 (2013).
164. In re K.M.G., 229 P.3d 1227, 1232 (Mont. 2010) (“When the intent of the legislature cannot be
determined from the plain language of the statute, we examine the statute’s legislative history to deter-
mine its correct interpretation.”); see also Montanans for Justice v. State, 146 P.3d 759, 773 (Mont.
2006) (“When the legislative intent cannot be readily derived from the plain language, we review the
legislative history and abide by the intentions reflected therein.”); Thiel v. Taurus Drilling Ltd. 1980-II,
710 P.2d 33, 35 (Mont. 1985).
165. Cross, 332 P.3d at 217; Martien v. Porter, 219 P. 817, 819 (Mont. 1923) (“The same rules are
applied in the construction of the Constitution as in the construction of statutes.”); Keller, 553 P.2d at
1006 (“The same rules of construction apply in determining the meaning of constitutional provisions as
apply to statutory construction.”).
166. Cross, 332 P.3d at 217; Racicot, 794 P.2d at 1183; Keller, 553 P.2d at 1006 (“In determining
the meaning of a given provision, the intent of the framers is controlling.”).
167. Cross, 332 P.3d at 220 (internal citations omitted); Racicot, 794 P.2d at 1184–1186; Reichert,
278 P.3d 455, 480–481.
168. School Dist. No. 12 v. Hughes, 552 P.2d 328, 331 (Mont. 1976); Bd. of Pub. Ed. v. Judge, 528
P.2d 11, 14–15 (Mont. 1975).
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1. Intent Functioning as Meaning
The Court’s consistent use of intent terminology clouds the actual
work the Court is doing. In practice, the Court’s interpretive framework
looks to the plain meaning, and if there is ambiguity, the Court examines
the drafter’s intent. Although seemingly a search for intent, the Court uses
objective statements by the drafters as a means of determining meaning. A
few examples are illustrative. In Cross v. VanDyke,169 the Court was tasked
with interpreting whether or not Article VII, Section 9 required active prac-
tice of law or simply admission to the Montana Bar for the requisite pe-
riod.170 In resolving the question, the Court noted:
Given the extensive discussion of the Executive Article and the specific “ac-
tive practice” requirements for Attorney General, followed by the deliberate
decision to adopt a simplified Judiciary Article, the convention transcripts
make clear that the delegates understood and intended the difference between
the qualifications for Attorney General and the qualifications for Supreme
Court Justice.171
Using the Constitutional Convention transcripts, the Court determined “ad-
mitted” carried the meaning the delegates themselves understood it meant.
In Montana Environmental Information Center v. Department of Environ-
mental Quality172 (“M.E.I.C.”), the Court used a similar process. M.E.I.C.
required the Court to resolve how Article II, Section 3 and Article IX, Sec-
tion 1 should be construed. The environmental rights were either fundamen-
tal because they were listed in Article II, Section 3, or not fundamental
because Article II, Section 3 was enacted and implemented via Article IX,
Section 1.173 To resolve the question, the Court turned directly to the Con-
stitutional Convention transcripts and examined the delegate’s comments
for insight into how those dual provisions should be interpreted. The Court
held:
We conclude, based on the eloquent record of the Montana Constitutional
Convention that to give effect to the rights guaranteed by Article II, Section 3
and Article IX, Section 1 of the Montana Constitution they must be read to-
gether and consideration given to all of the provisions of Article IX, Section 1
as well as the preamble to the Montana Constitution. In doing so, we conclude
that the delegates’ intention was to provide language and protections which
are both anticipatory and preventative.174
Once again, the delegates’ statements regarding the provision function
as the meaning. How the delegates thought the provisions should work to-
169. 332 P.3d 215 (Mont. 2014).
170. Id. at 216.
171. Id. at 222 (emphasis added).
172. 988 P.2d 1236 (Mont. 1999).
173. Id. at 1243.
174. Id. at 1249.
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gether provided the construction of the provisions and therefore, the mean-
ing. The Court uses this process whenever it seeks to resolve ambiguous
text.175
Legal scholars have thoroughly attacked the use of intent as the touch-
stone for interpreting ambiguous statutes.176 And, as noted above, the Court
does not really seek “intent” even though that is the language it uses. As is
true in all legal realms, changes trickle slowly through the courts. Using
secondary sources to derive meaning ensures that the Court avoids the re-
buke of being “intentionalist-originalists,”177—those who examine intent as
opposed to meaning—but may cause some confusion if not closely ex-
amined. It is an easy fix for the Court to begin using meaning as that is
functionally what it already does.
2. Use of a Single Originalist Source
The second weakness in the Court’s originalism is the use of just one
source to determine the meaning of ambiguous provisions. Since 1972, the
Court has cited or referred to the Constitutional Convention transcripts at
least 164 times.178 The Court has referred to only 13 other ratification-era
sources and only four of those references come after the transcripts were
published.179
175. E.g. Racicot, 794 P.2d at 1182–1187; Reichert, 278 P.3d at 480–481; Sch. Dist. No. 12, 552
P.2d at 331 (“The rule is well established that, in construction of a constitution, recourse may be had to
proceedings of the constitutional convention.”).
176. E.g. Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U. L. REV. 204
(1980) (arguing it is impossible to pool together all the votes given on a piece of legislation or a consti-
tution and know what those voters intended and thought when they voted); H. Jefferson Powell, The
Original Understanding of Original Intent, 98 HARV. L. REV. 885 (1985) (arguing the framers believe
original intent was an unworkable inquiry).
177. Mitchell N. Berman, Originalism is Bunk, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 41 (2009).
178. See Westlaw Search, supra note 3.
179. Searches for “voter guide” or “voter information pamphlet” or “convention notes” and culling
out non-responsive documents returns only 13 results. See e.g. Poulson v. Walsh-Groves, 531 P.2d
1335, 1337 (Mont. 1975) (“As appellant expresses it, the question for decision is whether there is a
savings clause under which litigation pending at the time the 1972 Constitution went into effect, reaped
the benefit. Appellant urges that by implication Sections 3 and 6 of the Transition Schedule applied the
rights granted under Art. II, Sec. 16 retrospectively. Section 3 of the Transition Schedule with the
Convention notes reads . . . .”); State v. Olsen, 531 P.2d 1330, 1333 (Mont. 1975) (“The new statute and
the new constitution went into effect during the time this suit was pending. The language of the new
provision is clearly broader than the former law, and ‘necessary costs of litigation’ includes expert
witness and attorney fees. The Constitutional Convention notes appended to Art. II, Sec. 29, of the 1972
Montana Constitution, recite . . . .”); Keller, 553 P.2d at 1007 (“Perhaps the best indication of the intent
of the framers is found in the explanatory notes as prepared by the Constitutional Convention.”); Yunker
v. Murray, 554 P.2d 285, 288 (Mont. 1976) (“The explanatory notes of the Constitutional Convention
following Article VII, Section 8, further indicate that the word ‘incumbent’ appearing therein applies to
any judge in office.”); First Nat. Bank in Bozeman v. Sourdough Land & Cattle Co., 558 P.2d 654, 657
(Mont. 1976) (“The Convention Notes indicate . . . .”); Huber v. Groff, 558 P.2d 1124, 1131–1132
(Mont. 1976) (“The Convention Notes indicate there was no change between the new and the old provi-
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The first problem with the Constitutional Convention transcripts is
their lack of public availability during the ratification era and late publish-
ing date. Statewide press covered the Constitutional Convention,180 but
daily transcriptions of the proceedings were not available.181 Montanans
only had access to the Convention through the various news sources or
through attendance in person. As Charles Johnson reported, the back and
forth nature of the Constitutional Convention meant that
[d]elegates often reversed themselves, killing proposals that had passed and
reviving once-dead means. This flip-flopping made it difficult and confusing
to write editorials or analytical pieces in advance. Stories written in the morn-
ing often were outdated by afternoon.182
At best, news coverage during the Constitutional Convention did not cover
the details of the back-and-forth seen in the transcripts. The complete tran-
scripts became publicly available in 1981, a full nine years after voters rati-
fied the 1972 Constitution.183 While the transcripts might provide meaning
for what the delegates believed a provision meant, since they were not pub-
licly available, they could not have formed the basis for the broad public
meaning.184
The second problem with the transcripts is that they only provide in-
sight into—and only if the delegates were unanimous—the meaning
ascribed to a provision by a hundred individuals. However, if there is a
meaning understood by all the voters, the voters’ understanding should
trump the delegates’ understanding, since the voters were the ones who ac-
tually enacted and ratified the document.185 This is also a limitation on the
public meaning that can be drawn from the transcripts.
The Court and legal scholars have echoed these concerns as well.
Shortly after voters ratified the 1972 Constitution, the Court in Keller v.
Smith186 faced an ambiguous constitutional provision and opted to review
sion except as to grammer [sic]. It must then be assumed the 1972 Montana Constitution expresses the
intent of the framers more precisely. This is significant because there are differences in the wording of
the 1889 and 1972 sections. The 1889 section had the word ‘absolute’ before the word ‘control’ and the
1972 section adds the word ‘private’ before person, association, and corporation.”).
180. Johnson, supra note 37, at 56–58; Larson, supra note 37, at 46.
181. 3 MONTANA CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION VERBATIM TRANSCRIPT preface (1981) (recordings
taken were not transcribed until the transcripts were published in 1981) [hereinafter CONSTITUTIONAL
CONVENTION TRANSCRIPT III].
182. Johnson, supra note 37, at 55.
183. CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION TRANSCRIPT III, supra note 181, preface (Recordings taken were
not transcribed until the transcripts were published in 1981.).
184. See infra Part V(B)(4) for a further explanation of the problems relating to the Convention
Transcripts.
185. This has been argued on the federal level as well. See Robert G. Natelson, The Founders’
Hermeneutic: The Real Original Understanding of Original Intent, 68 OHIO ST. L.J. 1239, 1288–1289
(2007) (quoting JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS 18 (1996)).
186. 553 P.2d 1002 (Mont. 1976).
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the original meaning of the provision.187 Instead of looking to the tran-
scripts of the Convention, the Court looked to the “explanatory notes” pre-
pared by the Constitutional Convention and distributed to all registered vot-
ers in Montana before the ratification (actually known as the Voter Informa-
tion Pamphlet).188 The Court noted that this document was “[p]erhaps the
best indication of the intent of the framers.”189
When explaining why the Court turned to the Voter Information Pam-
phlet for meaning as opposed to the transcripts, the Court stated:
We remark in passing that we have not relied on the minutes of the Constitu-
tional Convention proceedings as indicative of the intent of the delegates. We
have purposely refrained from using this basis of interpretation as excerpts
from various portions of these minutes, among other things, can be used to
support either position, or even a third position, i.e. that the delegates simply
did not address the specific problem involved in this case. In the final analy-
sis, the collective intent of the delegates can best be determined by application
of the preceding rules of construction to the ambiguous language used in sub-
section (2), Article VII, Section 8, 1972 Montana Constitution, and approved
by the delegates.190
In 1990, the Court echoed the concerns voiced in Keller regarding the Con-
stitutional Convention transcripts. 191 In Racicot v. District Court of First
Judicial District,192 the Court, when outlining the process for constitutional
interpretation stated: “[t]his Court has warned that excerpted portions of
these transcripts can often be used to support almost any position. That
appears to be the case here.”193
Fritz Snyder, in his 2005 Montana Law Review article examining
Montana’s Right to Privacy and Right to Know provisions in Article II, also
highlighted these problems.194 Snyder noted that the Constitutional Con-
vention transcripts are “well-indexed” and “very convenient.”195 These con-
venient transcripts made it possible to “infer the presumed intent of the
delegates” regarding certain provisions with relative ease.196 However, as
Snyder remarks, this emphasizes the delegates’ meaning of a provision over
that of broader “voters of Montana” and, in effect, imputes the meaning
187. Id. at 1007.
188. Id.; VOTER INFORMATION PAMPHLET, supra note 46. R
189. Keller, 553 P.2d at 1007.
190. Id. at 1008.
191. Racicot, 794 P.2d at 1184.
192. 794 P.2d 1180 (Mont. 1990).
193. Id. at 1184 (internal citations omitted).
194. Fritz Snyder, The Right to Participate and Right to Know in Montana, 66 MONT. L. REV. 297,
300–301 (2005).
195. Id. at 300.
196. Id.
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from a hundred people to all the voters when those voters had no access to
the transcripts.197
The problems with using a single source, however, are addressable. As
described in Section II, Montana is blessed with a rich and broad ratifica-
tion discussion, replete with pamphlets distributed to every voter, inserts in
every newspaper, a wealth of media coverage, and a grassroots information
campaign. The Court should use these sources more frequently so it can
better reach the original public meaning of Montana’s Constitution.
V. MONTANA’S ORIGINAL SOURCES
When the text of the Constitution is unclear, the Court must determine
the original public meaning. Once the Court identifies the relevant sources
of original meaning, difficult questions surround the weight given to partic-
ular documents. The following section outlines a framework used for deter-
mining original meaning with federal documents, notes the various re-
sources available surrounding the ratification of the Montana Constitution,
outlines what those materials provide for content, and suggests a hierarchy
for their use.
A. Factors for Weighing Originalist Sources
If the text of a document is not clear, courts should go to “second-best”
sources (the text being the “first-best” source) to determine meaning. Vasan
Kesavan and Michel Paulsen describe the weight and authority given to
second-best sources well. “Second-best” sources are
certainly relevant and possibly persuasive sources of constitutional meaning,
but [ ] they are not authoritative and hence not conclusive. They are evidence
of meaning; they are not constitutive of meaning, and hence binding determi-
nations of meaning in their own right.198
As indicators of meaning, second-best sources “are not created equal; al-
though they are all admissible sources of meaning, some are more impor-
tant and relevant than others” and there is a limit to their applicability.199
For example, second-best sources provide meaning to otherwise ambiguous
provisions, but there is no way a secondary source should, for example,
allow 16 year-olds to vote in contrast to the clear text in Article IV, Section
2 that one must be 18 years old to vote in Montana.200
197. Id. at 300–301.
198. Vasan Kesavan & Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Interpretive Force of the Constitution’s Secret
Drafting History, 91 GEO. L.J. 1113, 1149 (2003) (emphasis original).
199. Id.
200. Id.; MONT. CONST. art. IV, § 2 (“Any citizen of the United States 18 years of age or older who
meets the registration and residence requirements provided by law is a qualified elector unless he is
serving a sentence for a felony in a penal institution or is of unsound mind, as determined by a court.”).
24
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Scholars, when determining which sources to use when interpreting
the United States Constitution and how much weight to give them, have
developed a series of factors for this process. Broadly stated, these factors,
which are examined fully below, are: (1) timeframe of the document; (2)
reliance versus contract understanding; (3) timing and distribution of the
publication; (4) public versus private understanding; and (5) character of
the author.
Founding-era documents carry more weight than post-founding docu-
ments.201 As Kesavan and Paulsen note, this is merely a restatement of the
maxim of jurisprudence “contemporanea exposition est fortissimo in
lege.”202 Loosely translated, it means contemporaneous interpretation is su-
perior to later interpretation. When weighing second-best sources, those
sources that were published prior to or immediately after the date of ratifi-
cation should be weighed more than those documents that come after the
ratification. For example, the U.S. Supreme Court has commented that the
“[t]he actions of the First Congress . . . are of course persuasive evidence of
what the Constitution means.”203 These actions are given more weight than,
for example, Justice Story’s Commentaries on the Constitution of the
United States, which was published in 1833.204 Both speak to meaning, but
the First Congress met immediately after the United States Constitution was
enacted while Justice Story’s work was published forty years after ratifica-
tion. When in conflict, the contemporaneous sources should control.
The second factor is whether the document was a “reliance” document
or a “contract” document. Reliance and contract theory express two differ-
ent views of how a document can be used.205 Reliance theory articulates
that one should trust the source because it was relied upon by a ratifier.206
Contract theory holds the Court should trust a given source because it pro-
vides the meaning of the document “in context, to ordinary readers, speak-
ers, and writers of the English language, reading a document of this type, at
the time adopted.”207 Generally, reliance theory is the public meaning of
something and contract theory is context or private meaning. When weigh-
ing the two against each other, a broad reliance understanding of something
(“I voted for this after reading that document.”) provides a far surer mean-
201. Kesavan & Paulsen, supra note 198, at 1165.
202. Id.
203. Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 980 (1991) (noted by Kesavan & Paulsen, supra note 198,
at 1165).
204. JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES (1833).
205. Kesavan & Paulsen, supra note 198, at 1152 (The terms “reliance” and “contract” theory are
those of David McGowan. Kesavan and Paulsen provided an excellent and concise summary of the
theories. David McGowan, Ethos in Law and History: Alexander Hamilton, the Federalists, and the
Supreme Court, 85 MINN. L. REV. 755 (2001)).
206. Id. at 1153–1157.
207. Id. at 1156–1157.
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ing than a contract understanding (“Based on how this document reads, this
is what that document means.”). For example, from these factors, one can
compare a private writing of a founder with the public writings of The Fed-
eralist. The private writings, or letters, demonstrate a contract-theory under-
standing. They indicate how private parties viewed those words, principles,
or ideas in that period. The Federalist, however, provided a broader208
meaning and also demonstrates reliance. It is a public document explaining
meaning. Without doubt, both indicate meaning, but one that demonstrates
a broader,public understanding of meaning should control over one that
provides context, narrow meaning, or a private understanding.
Timing and distribution factors look to the timing of the document’s
publication and then to the breadth of its distribution in the given electo-
rate.209 Once a document has been determined to be “founding-era” as op-
posed to “post-founding,” one must examine if the document was published
in time to actually provide understanding. For example, a document pub-
lished the day of an election might not have had enough time for people to
actually read it before voting. Or, if there is staggered voting (e.g., the
United States’ Constitutional ratification) a document might reach only a
few voters. Documents prepared and published in time to provide meaning
for voters should be weighed more than documents published late that had
only a little impact. Similar principles apply to distribution. If one source
was only distributed in one small geographic region (a newspaper’s distri-
bution for example) and another source was across the entire state, the
source with the widest reach should be weighed heavier than the source
limited in geography. The Federalist is a good example of the timing and
distribution factors.210 As to timing, as of Delaware’s ratification, The Fed-
eralist had only published sixteen of 85 essays and a total of eight states
ratified the U.S. Constitution before all the essays were published.211 For
distribution, The Federalist was only published in sixteen newspapers and
one magazine outside of New York City.212 A document with earlier timing
and wider reach than The Federalist would carry more interpretive weight.
Whether a document carries a public or private meaning is a factor
similar to that of reliance and contract, but it applies directly to the breadth
208. As amply noted by scholars, the distribution of The Federalist, while broader than a private
letter, was not very widespread. Kesavan & Paulsen, supra note 198, at 1155 (citing Elaine F. Crane,
Publius in the Provinces: Where was “The Federalist” Reprinted Outside New York City? 21 WM. &
MARY Q. 589, 590 (1964) (The Federalist was published in only 16 newspapers outside New York City,
and those newspapers were located in only four states: New York, Massachusetts, Virginia, Penn-
sylvania, New Hampshire, and Rhode Island. Further, those publications only printed 24 of the total 85
essays.)).
209. Kesavan & Paulsen, supra note 198 at 1153–1156.
210. Id. at 1153–1154.
211. Id.
212. Id. at 1154–1155 (citing Crane, supra note 208). R
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and scope of a meaning.213 If an originalist’s goal is to determine the mean-
ing, a broad public understanding of a meaning should control over a pri-
vate meaning. The former simply has more support than the latter. This is
best illustrated by comparing the ratification conventions of the various
states to an individual’s private writings. Ratifying conventions provide a
forum for far more than one person and are often a public occasion, whereas
an individual person’s private notes are just the opposite. The broader and
more public should control over the narrower and more private.
Finally, the character of the author plays a distinct role.214 Generally
speaking, individuals with authority due to education, position, or experi-
ence tend to carry more authoritative weight than individuals commenting
outside their expertise. Similarly, official publications tend to carry exten-
sive weight because the publications have specific requirements.215 As an
example, David McGowan argues that the U.S. Supreme Court’s regular
citations to The Federalist is an appeal “to the public character of Alexan-
der Hamilton, James Madison, or John Jay to support its conclusion.”216
Government publications on the meaning of the U.S. Constitution were not
available during ratification, but such a publication would have carried the
same aura of authority.
B. Sources for Montana Originalist Research
Unlike the Federal Constitution, Montana’s 1972 Constitutional ratifi-
cation history is extensive and well documented. Each of the documents
noted in Section II can be evaluated using all or some of the factors outlined
above. Jurists and scholars must examine each document and give it its
relative weight on the scale when conducting an originalist inquiry.
1. Voter Information Pamphlet
The Voter Information Pamphlet meets each and every factor and car-
ries considerable weight. The Voter Information Pamphlet was the only of-
ficial, government-sponsored document published regarding the constitu-
tion.217 It was distributed to all registered voters.218 The pamphlet is also a
reliance document indicative of public meaning. The pamphlet outlined the
213. Id. at 1159.
214. McGowan, supra note 205, at 758.
215. See e.g., MONT. CODE ANN. § 13–27–401 (2013).
216. McGowan, supra note 205, at 758.
217. 1971 Mont. Laws 1232 (The Convention was directed “to compile, prepare and assemble essen-
tial information and materials for the delegates, without any recommendation; to disseminate informa-
tion to the public on the constitution and convention as deemed desirable.”); Kvaalen, 496 P.2d at
1129–1135.
218. Kvaalen, 496 P.2d at 1130.
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text of each provision in the proposed constitution and provided an accom-
panying explanation of that provision. For example, Article II, Section 3’s
comments provided:
Revises 1889 constitution by adding three rights relating to the environment,
basic necessities, and health. The last sentence is also new and provides that
in accepting rights people have obligations.219
Other notes merely highlighted that grammar had been changed, but no sub-
stantive modification had been made. Article II, Section 2’s comments
noted:
No change except in grammar. Gives Montanans the right to govern them-
selves and to determine their form of government.220
These comments provided a meaning to each and every provision by
describing what those provisions did and how they functioned. Voters who
read the pamphlet would have used this document as an explanation, there-
fore relying on it, and voted accordingly. These factors make the Voter
Information Pamphlet the best of the second-best sources for determining
the meaning of ambiguous provisions.
2. Roeder Pamphlet
The Roeder Pamphlet meets many of the same factors as found in the
Voter Information Pamphlet, with the exception of one: government publi-
cation. The Roeder Pamphlet was not an official publication, but it did
come from a very reliable source. Dr. Richard Roeder, one of the principle
authors of the pamphlet and a convention delegate, was a well-known Mon-
tana State University history professor who later co-authored Montana: A
History of Two Centuries.221 Further, the pamphlet had extensive distribu-
tion across Montana. The pamphlet was inserted into almost every newspa-
per across the state in time for voters to read and understand.222 Like the
Voter Information Pamphlet, the Roeder Pamphlet went provision by provi-
sion through the proposed constitution and explained what each meant. For
example, the pamphlet explained that Article II, Section 10
establishes a right of privacy. The courts in Montana have recognized the
existence of a right of privacy, but at a time when opportunities for invasion
of privacy are increasing in number and sophistication, section 10 emphasizes
that this right is essential for the preservation of a free society.223
The Roeder Pamphlet pales only in comparison to the Voter Information
Pamphlet’s government authorship and is an excellent second-best source.
219. VOTER INFORMATION PAMPHLET, supra note 46, at 6.
220. Id.
221. MALONE & ROEDER, supra note 20. R
222. ROEDER PAMPHLET, supra note 51, at 1.
223. Id. at 2.
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3. Neely Pamphlet
Gerald Neely, a Billings attorney, authored A Critical Look: Mon-
tana’s New Constitution, a document now known as the Neely Pamphlet.224
During the Constitutional Convention, Neely published a newsletter and
worked as a United Press International reporter on the Convention.225 Al-
though the extent of the pamphlet’s distribution is unknown, the subscrip-
tion nature of it, built through the prior newsletters Neely published during
the Constitutional Convention, at least points to a somewhat wide distribu-
tion.226 Neely’s status as a recognized attorney and his work as a reporter
during the Convention also lends extensive weight to the character of the
author. The pamphlet was published in the intervening time between the
end of the Convention and the vote, but an exact date is not indicated on the
document. Unlike both the Voter Information Pamphlet and the Roeder
Pamphlet, Neely’s work only explains some provisions instead of going
through each and every one. However, the pamphlet does cover the major
provisions of the proposed constitution.227 For example, regarding the dis-
crimination provisions in Article II, Section 4, Neely notes
[t]he provision goes far beyond current state or federal laws in the types of
discrimination involved and with respect to whom it applies to . . . Some of
the more interesting ramifications come to mind. A Jaycee Club could not ban
women, nor could the YWCA ban men. . . assuming each of these were the
prevailing reason.228
Readers of Neely’s pamphlet would have used it as an explanation of what
those provisions meant, and it serves as a good second-best source, but
questions about distribution lower it slightly below the Roeder Pamphlet.
4. Constitutional Convention Transcripts
The actual Constitutional Convention transcripts are missing some im-
portant factors necessary to give them considerable interpretive weight.
While clearly a founding-era document, the transcripts were not available in
published form until 1979, well after the ratification.229 This gives rise to
problems with public understanding and reliance theory. The transcripts’
lack of availability during ratification means there was very limited public
knowledge of the minute-by-minute transcripts and therefore they could not
have informed public meaning or been used as a reliance-based document.
Instead, this places the transcripts squarely into the contract and private
224. Id. at 1–3.
225. Id. at 3.
226. Id.
227. Id. at 7–28.
228. NEELY PAMPHLET, supra note 54, at 10.
229. CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION TRANSCRIPT I, supra note 32. R
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meaning realms. The transcripts indicate how the delegates viewed the doc-
ument, and to this end they provide excellent insight, but that insight is
quite limited by the problems with timing and broad understanding. As
such, the Constitutional Convention transcripts are a second-best source
falling behind the Voter Information Pamphlet, the Roeder Pamphlet, and
the Neely Pamphlet.
5. Montana Constitutional Convention Commission Reports
Similar to the Constitutional Convention transcripts, the Commission
Reports, though founding-era documents, had limited availability. The fo-
cused nature of the reports—“for the Convention”230—implies a very lim-
ited distribution. The Commission Reports were published to aid the dele-
gates, not the public, in preparing for the Constitutional Convention.231
Therefore, the dual lack of reliance and informing public meaning limits
their function to informing the delegates themselves. As Fritz and Snyder
noted, the delegates heavily relied on the reports in their deliberations, but
that appears to be the extent of the reports’ use.232 The Commission Reports
should only be used when there are questions as to what the delegates
meant in the transcripts. Beyond that, they provide little public meaning.
6. 1889 Constitution
The 1889 Constitution has limited, but important, interpretive weight.
As Montana’s constitution leading up to the1972 Constitutional Conven-
tion, the 1889 Constitutionwas a very well-known  and thoroughly inter-
preted document. The 1889 Constitution was a founding-era document, ap-
propriately timed because it was in place until the new constitution was
ratified and widely distributed. The Voter Information Pamphlet also cre-
ated extensive reliance on the 1889 Constitution itself. When provisions in
the proposed constitution were left unchanged from the 1889 Constitution
or had minor modifications, the Voter Information Pamphlet noted such and
provided no further explanation. In effect, the Voter Information Pamphlet
imputes its authority and accompanying understanding when it references
the 1889 Constitution. For example, Article II, Section 1’s explanation
noted that it was “[i]dentical to the 1889 constitution.”233 This reliance by
the Voter Information Pamphlet rises whenever the 1889 Constitution, and
its meaning in 1972, were referenced by the pamphlet. Likewise, whenever
230. CONVENTION STUDIES, supra note 28, at Report 1, iii. R
231. Id.
232. ELISON & SNYDER, supra note 6, at 10–11. R
233. VOTER INFORMATION PAMPHLET, supra note 46, at 6 (The pamphlet is replete with these refer-
ences.).
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another document such as the Roeder or Neely pamphlets refers to a change
in light of the 1889 Constitution, such authority ought to be imputed as
well. Therefore, even though the 1889 Constitution is no longer in force, its
meaning as of 1972 still carries weight where appropriate.
7. Ratification Era Newspaper Articles & Opinion Pieces
Throughout the Constitutional Convention and the ensuing ratification
process, newspapers across Montana published various articles regarding
the Convention, the proposed constitution, and its meaning.234 These arti-
cles carry the character weight found in journalism and ought to be re-
garded as reliable sources. Newspaper articles functioned as reliance-based
documents that individuals would have used to understand the proposed
constitution and therefore would have provided a public meaning on the
topics and provisions covered. However, unlike the three pamphlets above,
a newspaper’s distribution can be limited to its geographic area. In Mon-
tana, the major cities each have their own newspaper. As such, each paper,
although it may be distributed across the state, is primarily focused on the
city it is located in and the surrounding geographic area. However, this
changes if various newspapers across the state published the same article or
provided the same explanation for a provision in the proposed constitution.
For example, the Lee State Bureau’s 21-article series appeared in Missoula,
Billings, Butte, and Helena, giving it far more geographic reach than an
article published only in one area. 235 Therefore, depending on the geo-
graphic distribution, newspaper articles should be weighed equal with the
statewide pamphlets or below them.
8. Varying Private Documents, Correspondence, or Association
Materials
The Documentary History of the Ratification of the Montana Constitu-
tion Collection housed at the Jameson Law Library contains a broad array
of newsletters, letters, memorandums, and other correspondence from dele-
gates, private citizens, and various associations both supporting and oppos-
ing the 1972 Constitution. Although clearly timely and founding-era docu-
ments, most of these materials were quite limited in distribution. Many
234. See DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 50 (The collection has newspapers available from
Mar. 22–June 6, 1972.); Larson, supra note 37; Johnson, supra note 37; ELISON & SNYDER, supra note
6, at 14–15. These documents are largely available at the Jamison Law Library, University of Montana, R
Missoula, Montana in the DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE MONTANA CONSTITU-
TION, available at http://perma.cc/8VNG-C4U8.
235. Johnson, supra note 37, at 57–58. Lee Enterprises owns newspapers in Helena, Butte, Billings,
and Missoula and, as such, the Lee State Bureau provided reporting to those papers. Lee Enterprises,
Markets, http://perma.cc/F87U-UBLH (last accessed Nov. 15, 2015).
31
Stockton: Originalism and the Montana Constitution
Published by The Scholarly Forum @ Montana Law, 2016
\\jciprod01\productn\M\MON\77-1\MON104.txt unknown Seq: 32  9-FEB-16 12:52
148 MONTANA LAW REVIEW Vol. 77
were letters within specific advocacy organizations or private correspon-
dence responding to an inquiry. As such, these factors lower the weight of
these materials to contract-based understanding or smaller, public mean-
ings. Before using these sources, the Court should give each document its
appropriate weight.
9. Opposition Materials
During the ratification debate, there was significant opposition to the
proposed constitution.236 Opposition largely rallied around taxation issues
and was prevalent in newspaper, radio, and television coverage.237 How-
ever, even though the vote was close, the opponents lost. Opponents could
have had two major disagreements with the proposed constitution: differ-
ences over meaning and impact; or differences over policy choice as a
whole. Either way, the opponent’s interpretation was not the dominant
meaning and the proposed policy choices were rejected. As such, opposi-
tion materials ought to be weighed much lower. For meaning-related issues,
the slim passage majority denotes that a larger majority thought it meant
something different and for the policy questions, again, a majority decided
they wanted those policies. Therefore, there is no reliance nor is there pub-
lic meaning, regardless of how broadly the information was disseminated.
Like the Anti-Federalist writings, little weight is accorded the losing
side.238
VI. CONCLUSION
Originalism gives a voice to those who enacted a document. Montana
is blessed to have the excellent documentary history that illuminates the
meaning Montanans understood when they enacted the 1972 Constitution.
The Montana Supreme Court is, at its heart, originalist, and could further
expand its originalist jurisprudence by embracing the rich history of docu-
236. ELISON & SNYDER, supra note 6, at 17–19. R
237. Johnson, supra note 37, at 57–58.
238. Kesavan & Paulsen, supra note 198, at 1152 (citing Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers
Corp., 341 U.S. 384, 394 (1951) (“The fears and doubts of the opposition are no authoritative guide to
the construction of legislation.”)). Akhil Amar has also commented on the weight of the Anti-Federal-
ists, noting “we must exercise special caution in using writings of those who opposed the Constitution
and lost; their understandings of the meaning of the document may often be inferior to the Federalists’.
But in many cases, Anti-Federalist literature may help 20th century lawyers confirm Federalist readings.
For example, leading pamphleteers from the two camps often agreed about what a particular clause
(such as the preamble) meant, or whether a given doctrine (such as judicial review) was implicit in the
plan; they disagreed only about whether such provisions commended or condemned the document.”
Akhil Reed Amar, Our Forgotten Constitution: A Forgotten Comment, 97 YALE L.J. 281, 289 (1987).
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ments Montana has readily available. A turn to those sources would give
true meaning to the Constitution’s Preamble: “We the people . . . establish
this constitution.”239
239. MONT. CONST. pmbl.
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